FM 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain
Chapter 1 Introduction: The rapid growth of the number and size of urban centers, especially in regions of political instability, increases the likelihood that US forces will be called upon to conduct MOUT, (Military Operations in Urban Terrain)
Chapter 2 Urban Analysis: Combat in urban areas requires thorough knowledge of the terrain.... To succeed in urban areas, commanders and leaders must know the nature of both the terrain and of the enemy they may face. They must analyze the effect the urban area has on both threat and friendly forces.
Chapter 3 Urban Combat Skills: Successful combat operations in urban areas depend on the proper employment of the rifle squad. Each member must be skilled in moving, entering buildings, clearing rooms, employing hand grenades, selecting and using fighting positions, navigating in urban areas, and camouflage.
Chapter 4 Offensive Ops: From 1942 to the present, shock units or special assault teams have been used by attackers (and often by defenders) with great success. These assault teams are characterized by integration of combined arms. Assault teams typically contain Infantry with variable combinations of armor, artillery, or engineers
Sniper Tactics: Snipers have always played a large role in urban
combat. They have been used to disrupt operations, inflict casualties, and
tie down large numbers of troops searching for them. The lethality and
accuracy of modern weapons, the three-dimensional aspect of urban
battlefields, and the many alleyways, corridors, and rear exits available to a
sniper make him a serious threat. Commanders and leaders at all levels
must be aware of the value of employing snipers and the threat posed by
enemy snipers. They must understand the effects a sniper can have on
unit operations, and the steps by which he can be countered and his threat
minimized. In this chapter, the term sniper is used to describe a trained
sniper team or a single rifleman firing carefully aimed shots from short to
Chapter 7 Employment and Effects of Weapons: This chapter supplements the technical manuals and field manuals that describe weapons capabilities and effects against generic targets. It focuses on specific employment considerations pertaining to combat in urban areas, and it addresses both organic infantry weapons and combat support weapons.
Chapter 8 Obstacles, Mines, and Demolitions: In urban combat, obstacles and mines are used extensively by the defender to canalize the enemy, impede his movement, and disrupt his attack.
Chapter 9 Employment of Attack and Assault / Cargo Helicopters: Ground maneuver commanders must understand that aviation forces can provide a significant advantage during UO. (Urban Ops) In addition, ground maneuver planners must understand that the unique capabilities of Army aviation also require unique planning and coordination. Army aviation forces must be fully integrated in the military decision-making process (MDMP) to ensure effective combined arms employment. Effective combined arms employment also requires that aviation and ground maneuver forces synchronize their operations by operating from a common perspective. This chapter highlights some possible procedures that will aid in creating a common air-ground perspective.
Chapter 10 Fires: Coordinating lethal and nonlethal effects are an extremely important function for fire support officers (FSOs) at all levels. This chapter provides planning considerations and practical TTP for FSOs at the brigade, battalion, and company levels.
Chapter 11 Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability: "A squad of engineers from a platoon of the 1st Engineer Battalion was to accompany each assault company. The squad would be equipped with flame-throwers and dynamite charges for the reduction of pillboxes." -- LTC Darrel M. Daniel, Commander, 2nd Bn, 26th Inf Regt, October, 1944, Battle of Aachen
Combat Support: "The third battalion with a platoon of medium tanks, a
platoon of tank destroyers, a platoon of engineers, and a 155 mm self-propelled
rifle arrived in the Farwick Park section...on 13 October 1944...On 14 October a
section of 4.2 chemical mortars was attached to Company 'M'. A general
counterattack all along the battalion front was stopped...on 15 October." ---
Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, U.S. Army in
World War II
Chapter 13 Combat Service Support: During urban operations (UO), the terrain and the nature of the operations create unique demands on the battalion combat service support (CSS) system. Increased ammunition consumption, casualties, transportation difficulties resulting from rubble, and the decentralized nature of operations all challenge the battalion CSS operators and planners. Solutions to these problems require innovative techniques and in-depth planning. This chapter focuses primarily on battalion-level CSS, but brigade- and company-level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) have been inserted where applicable. All types of Infantry forces can use the TTP in this chapter, with modifications.
Chapter 14 Stability Operations and Support Operations: Units may have to conduct operations in environments that do not involve traditional combat. A unit may be called upon to conduct a stability or support contingency operation and then have to quickly transition into offensive or defensive missions. A unit may also be utilized in a stability or support operation at the successful conclusion of a combat mission. When assigned a stability or support mission, a well-trained unit must be able to rapidly shift its focus from war fighting to stability and support and also from stability and support to war fighting. While stability operations and support operations can occur anywhere, they will most likely occur in an urban environment. During a stability operation or support operation, units perform many activities not necessarily contained in its mission-essential task list (METL). While this chapter specifically addresses companies and company teams, many of the planning factors and TTP are applicable to levels above and below the company, with modifications. (See TC 7-98-1 for additional considerations and TTP.)
URBAN OPERATIONS UNDER RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS
During operations on urban terrain, commanders can expect to encounter restrictions on their use of firepower. Basic doctrinal principles remain the same, but the tactics, techniques, and procedures may have to be modified to stay within established rules of engagement (ROE) and to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.
URBAN OPERATIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY
With the rapid development of night vision devices throughout the world and doctrine that mandates continuous operations, US forces will continue to fight in built-up areas regardless of the weather or visibility conditions. To be successful, leaders must anticipate the effects of limited visibility conditions on operations and soldiers.
LIGHT INFANTRY AND ARMORED VEHICLE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
"...to breach these barricades and destroy (North Korean) defenders, the Marine and Army forces developed a highly effective combined arms team...Most UN forces quickly discovered that rifles or machine guns lacked the penetrating power and punch to overcome hardened (North Korean) barricade defenses." Robert Tallent, "Street Fight in Seoul", The Leathernecks: An Informal History of the US Marine Corps, as quoted in Armor Magazine, Sep-Oct 01
"The side possessing better information and using that information more effectively to gain understanding has a major advantage over its opponent."
While formal alliances have developed effective methods for integrating forces, most coalitions are created on short notice. As a result, coalition members must quickly develop detailed plans. This coalition planning guide will assist commanders and their staffs during the decision-making process in organizing their efforts to integrate their forces into the overall coalition structure. This guide is not all-inclusive. Additional actions may be required, depending on the coalition's operational mission and or composition. Depending on the unique situation that exists in the urban area, many of the staff functions discussed below will be performed by the higher headquarters. If so, commanders at all levels must ensure that their staffs conduct adequate coordination to ensure smooth implementation of the higher headquarters' decisions.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS, AND THE USE OF OBSCURATION
International and domestic law place severe limitations on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in armed conflict. The US condemns the use of all biological and bacteriological agents under any circumstances. Potential enemies may not operate under the same restrictions and may employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or release toxic industrial materials (TIM). Commanders and leaders must be prepared to assume an adequate NBC defensive posture when conducting urban operations. Leaders must be aware of how the urban environment affects the protection, detection, and decontamination process. Additionally, urban areas can contain many TIM. Release of these materials can pose a significant threat to friendly forces and noncombatants. This chapter will provide commanders and leaders with information and guidance concerning defense against WMD and TIM. (For additional information, see FM 3-9.)
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS CHECKLISTS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
Commanders use priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and essential elements of information (EEI) to facilitate rapid crisis planning. Intelligence staffs at all levels must be prepared to react to crisis situations and provide commanders with accurate, timely, and detailed intelligence and information in support of urban operations. (See FM 34-130 for more detailed information.)
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MODERN URBAN COMBAT
Although the US Army has a long history of combat operations in urban areas, it is not alone in conducting UO. Other armies have also conducted extensive urban combat, some very recently. Just as each war is unique, each nation's army is a unique reflection of its national strategy, government, economy, demographics, and culture. For that reason, no one lesson learned can be valid for all cases of urban combat. It is important, however, to study and to learn from the experiences of others. This appendix presents abstracts from various sources of information on the lessons learned by non-US armies in recent urban combat. Because of the subjective nature of such abstracts, no attempt is made to validate these lessons against US experience. I sure hope someone is reading this, because it takes a lot of work. E-5 Spec 5 Paul Phillips.
PLATOON URBAN OPERATIONS KIT AND TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR MARKING BUILDINGS AND ROOMS
Urban operations present many unique challenges for the infantry platoon and squad. They face obstacles and hazards not found in any other environment. The infantry platoon/squads are required to breach obstacles, enter and clear buildings, and cross streets and open areas when conducting urban operations. To increase effectiveness of the unit and decrease risk to individuals, the infantry platoon/squad uses special equipment in the urban environment.
Knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is of great value to both the urban attacker and defender. To exploit the advantages of underground facilities, a thorough reconnaissance is required. This appendix describes the techniques used to deny the enemy use of these features, the tactical value of subterranean passage techniques, and the psychological aspects of extended operations in subterranean passages.
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS ON URBAN TERRAIN
The following information was extracted from the Berlin Brigade, USCOB/USAB Pamphlet 350-1, Combat in Cities Procedures, dated 13 July 1984. The information contained herein was updated and reviewed by subject matter experts (SMEs). This appendix is provided as additional TTP for the employment of mortars during urban combat.
COMMUNICATIONS DURING URBAN OPERATIONS
The complexities of the urban environment such as line-of-sight restrictions, inherent fortifications provided by structures, limited intelligence, densely constructed areas, and the presence of noncombatants can restrict military technology. Communications in an urban environment are extremely important. Prior planning is essential to ensure continuous communications. Units should anticipate possible communications failures during UO. Nonelectronic communication signals must be planned for and practiced as alternative methods. This appendix addresses communications planning, communications methods, alternative communications, problems and possible solutions encountered with planning communications during UO.